Incentive Mechanism Design for Resource Sharing in Collaborative Edge
  Learning by Lim, Wei Yang Bryan et al.
1Incentive Mechanism Design for Resource Sharing in
Collaborative Edge Learning
Wei Yang Bryan Lim, Jer Shyuan Ng, Zehui Xiong, Dusit Niyato, Fellow, IEEE,
Cyril Leung, Chunyan Miao, Qiang Yang, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—In 5G and Beyond networks, Artificial Intelligence
applications are expected to be increasingly ubiquitous. This
necessitates a paradigm shift from the current cloud-centric
model training approach to the Edge Computing based col-
laborative learning scheme known as edge learning, in which
model training is executed at the edge of the network. In this
article, we first introduce the principles and technologies of
collaborative edge learning. Then, we establish that a successful,
scalable implementation of edge learning requires the commu-
nication, caching, computation, and learning resources (3C-L)
of end devices and edge servers to be leveraged jointly in an
efficient manner. However, users may not consent to contribute
their resources without receiving adequate compensation. In
consideration of the heterogeneity of edge nodes, e.g., in terms
of available computation resources, we discuss the challenges
of incentive mechanism design to facilitate resource sharing for
edge learning. Furthermore, we present a case study involving
optimal auction design using Deep Learning to price fresh data
contributed for edge learning. The performance evaluation shows
the revenue maximizing properties of our proposed auction over
the benchmark schemes.
Index Terms—Edge Intelligence, Edge Learning, Artificial
Intelligence, Resource Allocation, Incentive Mechanism
I. INTRODUCTION
The enhanced perception capabilities of state-of-the-art sen-
sors deployed on, e.g., the Internet of Things (IoT), Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and smart vehicles, have enabled a
wealth of raw data to be captured at the edge of the network
today. Empowered with the rise of Artificial Intelligence (AI)
based models which outperform conventional hand-engineered
methods when there is an abundance of training data, effective
models, e.g, for personalized recommendation, facial recog-
nition, and trajectory optimization, have been successfully
deployed on end devices, e.g., smart phones. However, with
the ubiquity of interconnected end devices, the burden on com-
munication networks necessitates the proposal of Edge Com-
puting as an alternative to current cloud-centric approaches in
which raw data has to be transmitted to centralized remote
servers for processing.
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The confluence of Edge Computing and AI gives rise to
Edge Intelligence, which leverages on the storage, communi-
cation, and computation capabilities of end devices and edge
servers to enable edge caching, model training, and inference
[1] closer to where data are produced. Specifically, edge
caching refers to the collection and storage of data, edge model
training refers to AI model training at the edge, whereas edge
inference refers to the deployment of trained models at the
edge and end devices for computation of desired outputs, e.g.,
image classification, given some input data.
In this article, we refer to the entire pipeline from data
collection to model training as edge learning. The edge
learning offers two main benefits over that of the cloud-
centric approach. Firstly, the raw data collected by end devices
can be processed locally, without the need for transmission
to the remote cloud, thereby reducing communication over-
head. Secondly, the computation capabilities of proximal edge
servers, e.g., roadside units (RSU), can be leveraged on to
complete time-sensitive tasks, e.g., multi-object detection for
autonomous driving.
However, there exist implementation challenges that have
to be addressed to enable efficient edge learning. Firstly,
privacy regulations that govern the sharing of data, e.g., the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), are increasingly
stringent [2]. Given that edge learning involves the utilization
of user1 data for decentralized model training, privacy preserv-
ing collaborative learning schemes have to be developed to
ensure sustainable participation of users. Secondly, AI models
are increasingly complex and over-parameterized [3]. Even
though end devices are equipped with improving computation
and communication capabilities, they are still much more
constrained relative to edge or cloud servers. As such, resource
sharing is required at the edge for efficient learning.
In this article, we first introduce the principles and tech-
nologies of collaborative edge learning. Then, we argue that
successful edge learning requires the sharing of communi-
cation, caching, computation, and learning resources (3C-L
resources) [4] among end devices and edge servers. However,
from the perspective of individual users, the consumption
of 3C-L resources is costly, e.g., in terms of device en-
ergy cost. Moreover, the 5G and Beyond networks comprise
heterogeneous edge nodes, i.e., users or edge servers, with
varying computation and communication capabilities, as well
as resource value, e.g., in terms of data quality, all of which are
private information. We recognize that incentive mechanism
1Note that we use the terms “users” and “end devices” interchangeably,
whereby users are owners of end devices and also data owners.
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2design plays an important role to facilitate sustainable resource
sharing for edge learning. Then, we further elaborate the
challenges of incentive mechanism design.
Currently, most incentive mechanism designs for edge learn-
ing assume the existence of only one monopolistic model
owner. In practice, there may be multiple model owners
competing for resources, e.g., user participation in FL. Inspired
by the work in [5] which proposes the concept of information
freshness, i.e., Age of Information (AoI), we present a case
study of optimal auction design using Deep Learning to price
the fresh data contributed towards model training in FL,
when there are multiple competing model owners. The main
contributions of this article are as follows:
• We provide a brief overview of principles and technolo-
gies of edge learning.
• We discuss the motivations behind why 3C-L resource
sharing is required to enable edge learning. Then, we
provide a discussion of the challenges of incentive mech-
anism design in edge learning, as well as the approaches
adopted in existing studies.
• We present a case study in which each user has a
certain information freshness and multiple model owners
compete for a user’s participation in FL. An optimal
auction is then designed using Deep Learning.
II. COLLABORATIVE EDGE LEARNING
In this section, we provide a brief overview of key col-
laborative edge learning schemes. In general, there are two
parties involved in edge learning: i) a model owner, e.g., a
developer of AI based applications, and ii) users, e.g., owners
of training data collected and stored on-device. There are two
main categories of edge learning schemes as follows.
A. Federated Learning
Federated Learning (FL) is a decentralized machine learning
paradigm proposed in the study in [6]. At the beginning of
the FL based model training, each user receives a set of
identical model parameters from the model owner, i.e., the
global model. Each iteration of model training consists of three
main steps as illustrated in Fig. 1:
1) Local model training: The user trains its received model
using locally stored data, e.g., through the Stochastic
Gradient Descent (SGD) algorithm to minimize a local
loss function.
2) Parameter transmission: The user transmits the updated
parameters to the model owner.
3) Global parameter update: The parameter updates from
all users are aggregated and averaged, in the case of
the conventional Federated Averaging algorithm [6], to
derive the updated global model.
At the end of each iteration, consisting of the above 3 steps,
the updated global model is transmitted back to the user for
the next training round. This process is repeated until a desired
model accuracy is achieved.
In fact, Step 3 of each iteration is usually conducted in
a synchronous manner, i.e., the global parameter update is
conducted only after all users have completed the local model
training. In contrast, an asynchronous aggregation implies that
the global parameter is updated whenever the model owner
receives a set of local parameter update from a worker. Most
studies of FL presently adopt the synchronous scheme due to
the convergence issues of the asynchronous aggregation.
FL avoids the exposure of a user’s sensitive raw data
to potentially malicious third-party servers. To account for
the statistical heterogeneity across users, several studies have
emerged with effective frameworks, e.g., through concepts
borrowed from multi-task learning in which each user learns
personalized models to ensure that high inference accuracy is
retained [2].
B. Model Partitioning Based Edge Learning
FL requires the training and communication of the full set
of model parameters between users and the model owner.
An alternative approach is the model partitioning based edge
learning [7] in which the user trains only a partition of the
model locally.
Recently, split learning (SL) has been proposed in [8]
whereby each participant only trains the neural network up
to a predefined portion, i.e., the cut layer (Fig. 1). Several
studies also consider the similar concept of deep neural
networks (DNNs) partitioning, in which the shallow layers of
the network are trained on-device, whereas the deeper layers
are offloaded to the edge servers or cloud for training. In
general, the training procedure consists of the following steps:
1) Local partitioned model training (forward pass): The
user trains the DNN up to a predefined layer, e.g., the
cut layer.
2) Computation offloading: The user transmits the training
outputs to an edge server to complete the other layers
of training. After a forward pass is completed at the
edge or cloud server, the resultant gradients are then
backpropagated up to the cut layer and returned to the
participants.
3) Local partitioned model training (backward pass): The
participants complete the backward pass from the cut
layer.
Note that the DNN partitioning can be optimized in con-
sideration of the energy constraints of user devices [9]. For
example, users with computationally-constrained devices can
have more layers offloaded to the edge servers for training.
On the other hand, users with idle computation resources can
complete the training locally, so as to save on communication
costs.
Similar to FL, the raw data of users remain locally stored
to preserve user privacy, i.e., only the training outputs are
transmitted to a third-party server. FL is easier to implement
than model partitioning based edge learning. In FL, the model
owner merely has to perform simple aggregation, e.g., through
Federated Averaging, of the collected local parameters. How-
ever, the model partitioning based edge learning is suitable
in applications in which a large DNN model is involved and
it may be infeasible for computationally-constrained users to
train completely on-device.
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Fig. 1: The end-edge-cloud collaboration with 3C-L resource sharing for edge learning.
III. RESOURCE SHARING AT THE EDGE FOR EFFICIENT
LEARNING
The key to collaborative edge learning is resource sharing,
i.e., the contribution of communication, computation, caching,
and learning resources (3C-L) from end devices and edge
servers to enable model training at the edge of the network.
It is envisioned that in 5G networks and beyond, the 3C-L
resources of end devices and edge users can be virtualized as
a common resource pool to satisfy the user requirements, e.g.,
Quality of Experience (QoE), and support collaborative edge
learning for the development of ubiquitous AI applications [4].
In this section, we discuss the 3C-L resource sharing at the
edge for collborative learning.
A. Communication
The collaborative schemes discussed in Section II require
communication of training outputs to the aggregating server.
However, users from remote regions with limited bandwidth
may have high dropout rates which disrupt the model training
process. To reduce dropout rates and enable the inclusion of
a wider group of contributing users for the model training,
an intermediate aggregation at proximal edge servers can be
adopted. In hierarchical FL [2], local model parameters can
first be aggregated on edge servers (Fig. 1). After several
rounds of intermediate aggregation, the parameters are then
transmitted from the edge servers to the cloud for global
aggregation. This can reduce the costs of communication with
the remote cloud.
However, certain end devices may still lack the required
connectivity for update transmission to edge servers. In such
cases, cooperative communication can be adopted in which
end devices can first be grouped into clusters. Then, the trained
parameters from each cluster are transmitted to a relay node
situated between the cluster and the edge server so as to
increase the network connectivity and capacity [1].
B. Computation
In model partitioning based edge learning, the deeper layers
of the DNN are offloaded, e.g., to cloud servers, for model
training given the hardware constraints of end devices.
To leverage on the available computation resources at the
edge of the network, device-to-edge (D2E) offloading can
be implemented with a lower communication cost incurred.
Moreover, clusters of end devices, e.g., stationary vehicles
[10], can potentially serve as virtual edge servers for device-
to-device (D2D) computation offloading [1].
C. Caching
Traditionally, the caching of popular files is implemented,
e.g., in multimedia streaming, to manage user request and
reduce communication and computation redundancy. With the
ubiquity of AI in our daily lives, AI models can now be
4cached in edge servers [1], [2] for communication efficient
edge learning. For example, the aforementioned hierarchical
FL involves the caching of intermediate models at the edge
(Fig. 1). At the beginning of each training iteration, the cached
model is transmitted to each end user for local model training.
Then, the cached model is updated through intermediate
aggregation, and communicated to the users again for another
iteration of training. The proximity of the edge server reduces
training latency and user dropout rates.
D. Learning
The proximity of edge servers enable efficient crowdsensing
whereby training data can be aggregated and validated at
the edge with reduced latency [11]. Beyond crowdsensing,
a new paradigm called crowd learning can be enabled with
collaborative edge learning. Amid data privacy concerns, the
privacy preserving properties of, e.g., FL, will encourage
greater participation in model training. Given that represen-
tation learning models perform well when large quantities of
training data and abundant computation resource are available
[2], crowd learning can support the training of models that
generalize well by leveraging on the sensing, computation,
and communication resources of end users to train a shared
model. In fact, the next-word-prediction model of Gboard2
has been successfully trained using FL, whereas SL has been
considered for healthcare applications [8].
IV. INCENTIVE MECHANISM DESIGN
In Section III, we discuss how the 3C-L resources of end
devices and edge servers can be leveraged to facilitate efficient
edge learning. However, users may not consent to share their
resources without receiving compensation or reward for the
corresponding costs incurred, e.g., energy cost due to model
training. Thus, there is a need for incentive mechanism [4] to
facilitate resource sharing for edge learning. For convenience,
we refer to the model owner as the buyer (of 3C-L resources)
and the user (who is the owner of the resource) as the seller.
We also tag each seller with a type according to the underlying
value of the seller’s resource, e.g., high type sellers with more
training data available are more desirable than low type sellers
with less training data available.
In the following, we discuss key challenges of incentive
mechanism design:
• Incentive mismatch: There is a fundamental difference in
the objectives between buyers and sellers in the resource
sharing market for edge learning. On one hand, buyers
wish to minimize costs in providing incentives while
maximizing the quality of the resources acquired from
sellers. On the other hand, sellers wish to receive the
maximum compensation for their resources. Incentive
designs are required to achieve a balance between these
conflicting goals.
• Network heterogeneity and information asymmetry: The
5G and Beyond networks are envisioned to consist of
thousands of heterogeneous end devices and edge servers,
2gboard.app.goo.gl/get
with different capabilities and resource values. However,
as a result of the privacy-preserving properties of col-
laborative learning schemes, it is not possible for the
resource buyer to evaluate a resource, e.g., computation
capability, directly. A well-designed incentive mechanism
should elicit the truthful revelation of seller types.
• Dynamic Conditions: Conventional incentive mechanism
designs are based on analytical methods. However, given
the growing complexity and capacity of future networks,
the dynamic conditions in the network cannot be com-
pletely modeled or solved with standard approaches [12].
As a result, DNNs are being increasingly adopted for the
design of learning-based incentive mechanisms [13].
Some most commonly used incentive tools considered in
existing studies are as follows:
• Contract Theory: In contract theory, contract bundles
consisting of resource contribution-reward pairs are de-
signed for different seller types. The contracts are de-
signed such that the incentive compatibility constraint
is met, i.e., each utility maximizing seller only chooses
the contract designed for its own type. This ensures that
rational sellers do not misreport their types.
• Game Theory: The Stackelberg game is particularly use-
ful in modeling edge learning schemes, with the model
owner (buyer) assuming the role of a leader whereas
the users (sellers) are followers. Specifically, the game
consists of two stages. In the first stage, the leader
announces a reward. In the second stage, the follow-
ers determine the level of resource contribution, e.g.,
computation resource contributed for edge offloading, in
response to the expected reward in the first stage, as well
as the actions of other followers [2].
• Auction Theory: In an optimal auction design, a buyer
only submits a truthful bid for a seller’s resource, i.e.,
there is no incentive to misreport its valuation of a
resource. For reverse auctions, sellers bid for the prices
at which they are willing to sell their resource at, e.g.,
participation in FL based model training. In contrast to
procedures in the contract and game theory approaches,
the reverse auction approach [14] enables users to actively
report their types.
Most incentive mechanism design studies in edge learning
assume the existence of only one monopolistic buyer. In
practice, there may be multiple buyers, e.g., rival companies,
each seeking to develop an AI application for their own
purposes. For this scenario, we present a case study in which
an auction is held among multiple model owners who compete
for a user’s resource.
V. OPTIMAL AUCTION WITH DEEP LEARNING
In this section, we present a case study in which an auction
is held among multiple model owners (bidders) to buy the
resources of a worker (sellers in Fig. 2) in the FL based
model training. We then use a Deep Learning approach to
ensure truthful reporting of the model owner’s valuation amid
information asymmetry. Note that the proposed mechanism
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Fig. 2: System Diagram of the Optimal Auction in FL.
can be straightforwardly applied to other model partitioning
based edge learning methods such as split learning.
At any point of time, each worker can only participate in the
FL training initiated by one model owner, i.e., there can only
be a single winner of the auction. Workers that are found to sell
their services to more than one model owner simultaneously
are penalized, e.g., by being barred from participating in
future training instances. Moreover, to preserve the privacy
of workers, the model training is implemented locally as
discussed in Section II-A.
A. Auction Framework
We consider a system model in which a worker’s data are
associated with a particular AoI [5], i.e., the time elapsed
between the collection of data by the worker to the completion
of the FL model training. For example, a worker which updates
its data more frequently has a lower AoI, i.e., the data it uses
for model training is relatively fresh.
If the model owner prefers data with low AoI values, e.g.,
for the development of navigation systems in autonomous
vehicles, it has an incentive to pay a higher price to the
worker with low AoI. In contrast, if the model owner does
not value fresh data, e.g., for the development of a location-
based recommender system in which user preferences are only
slowly time-varying, it will not pay a high premium for data
with low AoI. Specifically, the bid value of the model owner
is inversely proportional to the AoI associated with a worker.
To maximize the revenue of the worker and ensure that each
worker is allocated to the model owner that values its corre-
sponding AoI the most, the worker allocation problem can be
modeled as a single-item auction. Through the auction process,
a winning model owner and the corresponding payment for the
services of the worker are determined. An optimal auction has
two characteristics:
1) Individual Rationality (IR): By participating in the auc-
tion, the model owners receive non-negative payoff.
2) Incentive Compatibility (IC): There is no incentive for
the model owners to submit bids other than their true
valuations, i.e., the bidders always bid truthfully.
The traditional first-price auction, in which the highest bidder
pays the exact bid it submits, maximizes the revenue of
the seller but does not ensure that the bidders submit their
true valuation. The second-price auction (SPA), in which the
highest bidder pays the price offered by the second highest
bidder, ensures that the bidders submit their true valuations but
does not maximize the revenue of the seller. In order to ensure
that both conditions of truthfulness and revenue maximization
of the seller are satisfied, an optimal auction is designed using
the Deep Learning approach [15].
B. Deep Learning-Based Optimal Auction
In the following, we describe the Deep Learning-based
auction algorithm [15]. The bids of the model owner are first
transformed to derive the transformed bids, which meet the IR
and IC requirements. Then, a winner and the corresponding
payment are determined.
1) Monotonic Transform Functions: To ensure that the win-
ner determination and the corresponding payment satisfy
the IR and IC requirements, the transform functions have
to be strictly monotonically increasing. The precise form
of the transform function is derived using a two-layer
feed forward network trained to minimize the loss of the
network, i.e., the negated revenue of the worker. In other
words, this procedure is equivalent to the maximization
of the revenue of the worker.
2) Winner Determination: The winner is determined based
on the SPA with zero reserve price allocation rule. This
allocation rule maps the transformed bids to a vector
of assignment probabilities, i.e., winning probabilities,
using an approximated softmax function and a dummy
input. If the transformed bid is positive, the model
owner with the highest transformed bid wins the auction.
Otherwise, the worker does not participate in the FL
model training with any model owner.
3) Conditional Payment Price: To derive the required pay-
ment to be made by the winner, the payment prices of all
bidders are first calculated, followed by the conditional
price of the winning model owner. The payment prices
of the model owners are determined using a ReLU
activation function whereas the conditional price of the
winning model owner is determined using the monotonic
inverse transform function.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the Deep
Learning-based auction. For comparison, the classic SPA is
chosen as the baseline scheme. The TensorFlow Deep Learn-
ing library is used to implement the optimal auction design. In
our simulations, the AoI of the worker and the AoI preference
of the model owners follow uniform distributions, e.g., a
preference for lower AoI value implies that the buyer values
fresh information more.
Figure 3 shows that the Deep Learning approach allows the
worker to earn higher revenue than that of the traditional SPA
scheme. The reason is that the SPA scheme guarantees IC, but
does not guarantee that the revenue of the seller is maximized.
To illustrate the impact of model owners’ preference for AoI
on the worker’s revenue, we consider the scenario in which
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the worker has varying AoI, i.e., 0.3 and 0.8. From Fig. 4, the
worker’s revenue is greatly increased when the worker’s AoI
is low and falls within the range of AoI requirements by the
model owners. This serves as a compensation for the greater
data processing cost incurred by the worker to keep the AoI
low. Note that if the worker has an AoI lower than the model
owner requirement, there will be no winner in the auction.
Intuitively, model owners with AoI requirements above the
worker AoI has no incentive to pay a higher price for fresh
data.
Furthermore, we consider the worker’s revenue under differ-
ent number, N , of bidders in Fig. 5 and 6, i.e., N = 10, N =
15 and N = 20. As N increases, the worker’s revenue
increases. The competition among the model owners increases
with N . As such, model owners have greater incentive to
submit higher bids in order to win the auction. As a result,
the revenue of the worker increases. Moreover, workers with
fresher data receive higher revenue in compensation of the
greater data collection cost incurred.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
In this article, we first reviewed the principles and technolo-
gies in collaborative edge learning, followed by an overview
of incentive mechanism design to facilitate the 3C-L resource
sharing at the edge for efficient learning. We then presented
a case study for a scenario in which multiple buyers compete
for fresh data from a single seller. The performance evaluation
of a Deep Learning based auction shows the seller revenue
maximization properties of our designed auction.
For our future research directions, we aim to consider:
• Multiple bidder-multiple seller auction for 3C-L re-
sources: Currently, we have assumed the multiple bidder-
single seller auction framework. With multiple sellers
involved, the resulting competition among sellers may
drive the seller revenue downwards.
• Dynamic resource availability of sellers and buyers: In
some cases, edge learning is conducted over a period
of time, during which the sellers may have varying
resources, e.g., data quality, across time. In our proposed
mechanism, as well as most existing works, the dynamic
resource value is not considered.
• Collusion and coalition formation among model owners:
In practice, model owners may collude to bid for a
resource. This may in turn, affect the bidding strategies
and seller’s revenue.
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